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Abstract—Cooperative relaying is often deployed to enhance
the communication reliability (i.e., diversity order) and con-
sequently the end-to-end achievable rate. However, this raises
several security concerns when the relays are untrusted since
they may have access to the relayed message. In this paper,
we study the achievable secrecy diversity order of cooperative
networks with untrusted relays. In particular, we consider a
network with an N -antenna transmitter (Alice), K single-antenna
relays, and a single-antenna destination (Bob). We consider the
general scenario where there is no relation between N and K,
and therefore K can be larger than N . Alice and Bob are
assumed to be far away from each other, and all communication
is done through the relays, i.e., there is no direct link. Providing
secure communication while enhancing the diversity order has
been shown to be very challenging. In fact, it has been shown
in the literature that the maximum achievable secrecy diversity
order for the adopted system model is one (while using artificial
noise jamming). In this paper, we adopt a nonlinear interference
alignment scheme that we have proposed recently to transmit the
signals from Alice to Bob. We analyze the proposed scheme in
terms of the achievable secrecy rate and secrecy diversity order.
Assuming Gaussian inputs, we derive an explicit expression for
the achievable secrecy rate and show analytically that a secrecy
diversity order of up to minpN,Kq ´ 1 can be achieved using
the proposed technique. We provide several numerical examples
to validate the obtained analytical results and demonstrate the
superiority of the proposed technique to its counterparts that
exist in the literature.
Index Terms—Cooperative networks, interference alignment,
interference dissolution, secrecy diversity, untrusted relays.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Owing to its great potential in improving the communication
reliability of wireless networks, cooperative relaying has been
adopted as a key technology in major wireless standards,
including IEEE 802.11, among others [1]. One of the main
advantages of cooperative relaying is that it increases the
transmission range [2], which is crucial for achieving ubiq-
uitous coverage without compromising the quality of service
provided to customers [3]. Cooperative relaying will certainly
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continue to play a central role in shaping the backbone of next
generation wireless networks. This can be clearly seen from
the proliferation of heterogeneous devices connected through
large-scale networks, including Ad-hoc network femto-cells,
and the Internet of things (IoT), where information is delivered
to remote destinations through relaying. While cooperative
relaying has obvious benefits, it also poses serious security
risks. Indeed, relays are usually decentralized and it is often
the case that relays can be as simple as hand-held devices,
with limited computational capability. Consequently, relying
on cryptography-based techniques will be severely limited
and may not be an option [4]. Even when it is possible to
use cryptography, it may not be possible to achieve secure
wireless communication. This is due to the fact that infor-
mation in packet overheads is left unencrypted to facilitate
communication, and such overheads could provide a wealth
of information for eavesdroppers. This challenge has recently
led to an overwhelming interest in physical layer security
(PLS), which is considered as a first-line of defense against
eavesdropping [5]–[7].
The concept of PLS was coined by Wyner in his seminal
work [8] in which he introduced the wiretap channel. He
proved that, for a point-to-point degraded wiretap channel,
where an eavesdropper (Eve) receives a degraded version
of the signal sent from a transmitter (Alice) to a legitimate
destination (Bob), secure communication can be provided
without sharing a secret key between the communicating
parties. This result is encouraging in the sense that it is
possible to establish secure communications independent of
how powerful eavesdroppers can be in terms of computational
capability. However, the situation is completely different for
cooperative networks, especially when there is no direct link
between the transmitter and the legitimate destination. In such
a scenario, the signal received at the legitimate destination is a
degraded version of the signal received by the relays. It could
be the case that it is desired to not allow relays receiving the
signal to be able to extract any information contained by the
signal. To achieve this, the relays involved in relaying should
be considered as untrusted relays. Furthermore, one should
assume that there could be eavesdroppers adjacent to the relays
who will receive a copy of the signal received by the untrusted
relays. To the end, it is easy to conclude that it is possible that
the signal received at the destination is a degraded version of
the one received by untrusted relays and eavesdroppers. This
renders PLS-related techniques/results obtained for point-to-
point wireless networks irrelevant. This necessitates coming
up with new techniques to deal with this problem. Among the
performance metrics that need to be revisited in light of the
2above mentioned challenge include the achievable secrecy rate
and secrecy diversity order, which are the focus of this paper.
B. Relevant Literature
The fundamental question concerning exploiting untrusted
relays to enhance the secrecy rate was explored in [4], [9]–
[13] with favorable results. The authors in [4] considered a
cooperative system with an untrusted relay and they proposed
artificial noise-based transmission schemes whereby the desti-
nation sends artificial noise (AN) while the transmitter sends
the information signal (i.e., destination-aided jamming). Then
the (untrusted) relay amplifies and forwards the combined
signal (the information and AN signals). The destination uses
its perfect knowledge of the AN to subtract it form the
received signal, and then decodes the intended signal. This
technique was extended in [9] to the case of multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems with untrusted relays. The
authors showed that it is beneficial in terms of the secrecy
rate to treat relays as untrusted as opposed to treating them
as eavesdroppers. However, the loss in the achievable secrecy
rate, as compared to the case when the relays are trusted, could
be significant.
It is somewhat intuitive to assume that the secrecy rate
is improved as the number of untrusted relays increases.
However, the authors in [10], [11] showed the opposite; that
is, the secrecy rate decreases as the number of untrusted relays
increases. Moreover, it was shown in [12] that the achievable
spatial diversity associated with the confidential message is
limited to one, regardless of the number of untrusted relays
used in relaying. This is bad news because it suggests that
the loss incurred by treating the relays as untrusted degrades
the diversity significantly. As a remedy to this problem, the
authors in [13] proposed a scheme that involves using inter-
relay jamming whereby relays jam each other in an effort to
keep information confidential. The system model considered
in [13] comprises an N -antenna transmitter, K single-antenna
relays and a single-antenna destination, with the assumption
that the number of transmit antennas is larger than the number
of relays. It was shown that the achievable secrecy diversity
is improved to K´1. However, while this is a positive result,
it may not be useful because, in practical settings, the number
of relays is normally much larger than the number of transmit
antennas. Furthermore, the schemes in [10], [11] use some
forms of AN.
C. Problem Statement
The techniques pertaining to the problem at hand that exist
in the literature, as mentioned above, achieve at most a secrecy
diversity order of one for the practical scenario when the num-
ber of relays is greater than the number of transmit antennas.
This clearly limits exploiting the full potential of having many
untrusted relays in cooperative networks. Moreover, the notion
of using AN (whether relay-based or destination-based), which
is essentially used in [4], [9], [10], [12], [13], may result in
three main issues. First, in these works, AN is assumed to
be treated as noise by the eavesdroppers and this stems from
the belief that two interfering signals are indistinguishable in
a one-dimensional space unless a signal is treated as noise
while decoding the other. However, recent works showed that
it is possible to jointly decode intended and interfering signals
if they are transmitted over different channels [14]–[17]. For
instance, in [14], we proposed a scheme that is able to break
up a one dimensional space into two fractional dimensions. As
such, a destination equipped with one antenna can perfectly
extract two interfering signals received via different channels.
In [15]–[17], the authors proposed techniques dealing with
interference in a one-dimensional space, where they showed
that it is possible to jointly decode intended and interfering
signals received over different channels for almost all channel
realizations, which proves that interfering signals are naturally
aligned by the channel. They also showed that two signals
belonging to a discrete constellation are inseparable only if
they are transmitted simultaneously over the same channel,
i.e., aligned by the same channel. Even when signals do not
belong to discrete constellations, they can be discretized to
make their effect less severe by applying real interference
alignment. In light of these results, it is reasonable to assume
that an eavesdropper, collocated with a relay, may have the
possibility of efficiently decoding an intended signal in the
presence of AN, rendering relying on AN-based techniques
inefficient.
Second, AN-based approaches have the disadvantage of
consuming power given that the relay amplifies and forwards
the intended and AN signals at the same time. Third, when
the number of untrusted relays is large, the destination, when
acting as a jammer, will have to generate AN with high
power to jam all the relays including the ones that are far
from it. However, this results in the drawback of deteriorating
the quality of the intended signal at the destination. To
elaborate, considering that amplify-and-forward (AF) is used,
the forwarded signal will comprise the intended signal and the
AN signal. Given that the transmit power from the relays is
limited, when the AN power is relatively large, the intended
signal power will effectively be scaled down, which leads to a
lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the destination (after the
jamming signal is subtracted). Consequently, the achievable
secrecy rate will deteriorate. This leads us to believe that
relying solely on AN-based strategies may not be as efficient
as one may think.
D. Contributions and Outline
Motivated by the above discussion, we propose in this
paper a novel PLS scheme for cooperative networks with
multiple untrusted relays. It is assumed that there is no direct
link between the transmitter and the intended destination
and all communication is done through the untrusted relays.
This mimics a situation when the destination is far from the
transmitter. The proposed scheme does not use any form of
AN, which makes it completely different from its counterpart
schemes that have been proposed in the literature. In devel-
oping the proposed scheme, we make use of an interference
alignment scheme that we proposed in [14], which involves
precoding signals in a nonlinear fashion with the channel gains
such that only the destination will able to efficiently separate
interfering signals.
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N -antenna transmitter, K single-antenna untrusted relays and
a single-antenna destination. We consider that N,K ě 2.
However, there is no additional constraints concerning the
relation between N and K , implying that K may be arbitrarily
large and hence greater than N . As often considered in the
literature, we assume the worst case scenario where each relay
is collocated with an eavesdropper that is able to get the
same signal received by the relay it is collocated with. We
analyze the performance of the proposed technique in terms
of the achievable secrecy rate for which we drive a closed-
form expression that explicitly shows the impact of the number
of transmit antennas and number of untrusted relays on the
achievable secrecy rate. We use the derived secrecy rate to
derive the achievable secrecy diversity order. In particular,
we invoke the notion of the secrecy outage probability to
derive the achievable secrecy diversity order. Although the
obtained expression is exact, it does not reveal explicitly the
secrecy diversity order. To get around this, we derive an
upper bound on the outage probability, which shows that the
achievable secrecy diversity order is up to pminpN,Kq ´ 1q
while keeping the messages confidential with respect to all
untrusted nodes. In contrast, the technique proposed in [12]
offers secrecy diversity order one, and the one proposed in
[13] is not applicable to the system model considered in this
paper since K can be larger than N .
Note that the proposed technique does not use AN, which
helps to overcome the three issues related to the use of AN
listed above. As a result, the proposed technique offers the
advantage of significant power savings as compared to its
counterpart schemes, and this directly translates by a higher
transmission rate for the same total transmit power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model and we describe in details
the proposed technique. In Section III, we analyze the perfor-
mance of the proposed technique in terms of the achievable
secrecy rate. In Section IV, we derive the achievable secrecy
diversity order. Numerical results are provided in Section V.
We conclude the paper in Section VI.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use | ¨ |, p¨q˚, p¨qT
and x¨, ¨y to denote the 2-norm, the transpose conjugate, the
transpose operators and the inner product between two vectors,
respectively. We use Er¨s to denote the expectation operator.
In this paper, Ip¨q and Prr¨s denote the mutual information
and the probability of an event respectively.
II. PROPOSED SCHEME
A. System Model
The system model considered in this paper is depicted in
Fig. 1, which comprises an N -antenna transmitter (Alice), a
single-antenna destination (Bob) and K single-antenna relays
denoted by tR1,R2, . . . ,RKu. Knowledge of the whereabouts
of Eves is unknown to the relays nor to Alice or Bob.
Therefore, it is assumed that each relay is collocated with
an eavesdropper (Eve). Each Eve receives the same signal
received by the relay it is collocated with. This assumption
is adopted to account for the worst case scenario in terms
of the achievable secrecy rate, and it is commonly used in
the literature. As it will be elaborated on later in Section III,
among the available K relays, 2 ď L ď minpN,Kq realys
are selected at random to relay the confidential message to
Bob. The remaining K´L relays are treated as Eves. We are
aware that there are other relay selection criteria available in
the literature, but determining the optimal selection criterion
with respect to some performance metric is out of the scope
of this paper.
Fig. 1: System model.
All sub-channels are assumed to be quasi-static and the
channel gains follow the Rayleigh distribution with variance
one. The channel gains remain constant during a coherence
time and change independently from one coherence time
to another. For a given coherence time, the channel gains
vector between the transmitter and Rk is denoted by hk “
thk,1, hk,2, . . . , hk,Nu. The channel gain between Rk relay
and Bob is denoted by gk. We assume that all untrusted relays
have all the channel state information (CSI) of all sub-channels
which is the worst case scenario. Moreover, we assume that
Alice has the CSI of the channel between Alice and the
selected relays, and between the selected relays and Bob. The
selected relays remain the same during a coherence time.
B. Interference Dissolution for Cooperative Networks
We proposed in [14] an interference management technique,
referred to as interference dissolution (ID), with the objective
of managing interference in a one-dimensional space over
time-invariant channels. We showed that ID can achieve a
rate of two symbols per channel use. More importantly, it
was shown that ID achieves a non-zero degree-of-freedom
(dof) for all transmitted symbols, implying that all symbols
are perfectly separable at the destination. Building on those
promising results, we borrow in this paper the core idea of ID
and adapt it to the underlying system model, i.e., cooperative
networks with multiple untrusted relays.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that Bob in-
tends to transmit to Alice mL pairs of symbols, namely,
4ptx1,1, x1,2u, tx1,3, x1,4u, . . . , txL,2m´1, xL,2muq. Note that
the restriction on grouping the transmitted symbols into pairs
stems from the fact that ID was developed to achieve a rate
of two symbols per channel use [14]. The transmit power per
symbol is assumed to be P , i.e., Er|xl,i|2s “ P @tl, iu P
r1, Ls ˆ r1, 2ms.
Note that the mL symbols will be transmitted through the
selected L relays. These symbols are divided into L sets,
where each set contains 2m symbols. As it will be shown
below, 2pmL ` 1q channel uses are required to transmit the
2mL symbols. During the first channel use, the transmitter
beamforms each sum of m pairs of symbols in the direction
of a selected relay while nulling it out in the direction of
the remaining relays. This is performed through zero forcing
beamforming (ZFBF) [18]. That is, the sum of the lth symbol
pairs
ř2m
i“1 xl,i (l P r1, Ls) is beamformed in the direction of
Rl. This is done by multiplying it by the lth column vector bl
of the pseudo-inverse matrix
pbT1 , bT2 , . . . , bTLq “ H˚pHH˚q´1,
where H “ phl,iqtl,iuPr1,Lsˆr1,Ns is the channel matrix. The
lth row of the channel matrix is denoted by hl. We note here
that the multiplication with a beamforming vector may result
in a power amplification [18]. To deal with this, the transmitter
normalizes each beamforming vector with respect to its norm,
and therefore the signal received by textRl is expressed as
zl,1 “ h
1
l,l
2mÿ
i“1
xl,i ` nl,1, (1)
where h1l,l “ 1}bl}hlb
T
l and nl,1 is AWGN with zero mean
and variance σ2. We use h1 “ th1l,1, h
1
l,2, . . . , h
1
l,Lu
to denote the vector resulting from beamforming
tř2mi“1 x1,i,ř2mi“1 x2,i, . . . ,ř2mi“1 xL,iu to Rl (l P r1,Ks). In
(1), the elements h1l,j “ 1}bj}hlb
T
j (j ‰ l) do not appear
because they are equal to zero due to ZFBF.
In the second channel use, the relays simultaneously amplify
and forward their respective received signals. The average
power available at each relay is assumed to be 2mP . Each
relay has to normalize the received signal before transmis-
sion. The lth relay normalizes the received signals by factor
αl “
b
|h1l,l|2 ` σ
2
2mP
. Consequently, the signal received by
Bob can be written as
y1 “
Lÿ
l“1
˜
h
1
l,lgl
αl
2mÿ
i“1
xl,i ` gl
αl
nl,1
¸
` n1, (2)
where n1 is AWGN with zero mean and variance σ2. The
received signal can be written also in the following form.
y1 “
Lÿ
l“1
g
1
l
2mÿ
i“1
xl,i ` n11, (3)
where g1l “
h
1
l,lgl
αl
and n11 “
řL
l“1
gl
αl
nl,1 ` n1 is AWGN with
zero mean and variance σ2
´
1`řLl“1 |gl|2α2
l
¯
.
In the third channel use, the transmitter precodes
tx1,1, x1,2u, according to the ID technique [14], in order to
allow the destination to properly separate them from the other
symbols. To this end, the transmitter calculates a dissolution
factor β1 by solving [14]
g
1
1x1,1 ` β1g
1
1x1,2 “
Lÿ
l“1
g
1
l
2mÿ
i“1
xl,i, (4)
which gives
β1 “ 1` g
1
1
ř2m
i“3 x1,i `
řL
l“2 g
1
l
ř2m
i“1 xl,i
g
1
1
x1,2
. (5)
As detailed in [14], the transmitter sends a nonlinear combi-
nation of s1, s2 and β1 and hence, the received signal has the
following form.
y2 “ g
1
1x1,2 ´ β1g
1
1x1,1 ` n
1
2, (6)
where n12 is AWGN. The noiseless part of y2 is beamed in this
case in the direction of all selected relays. To guarantee that
the used power is 2mP , the transmitted signal is normalized
by ̺ “
b
1
2mP
Er|g1
1
x1,2 ´ β1g11x1,1|2s “
břL
1
|g1l|2. The
received signal by Rl can be then written as
zl,2 “
h
1
l,l
̺
pg11x1,2 ´ g
1
1β1x1,1q ` nl,2. (7)
In the fourth channel use, the selected relays precode then
forward their respective received signals. Indeed, Rl precodes
its received signals by multiplying it by pg
1
lq
˚
αl|g
1
l
|
. αl is used
to have average transmit power 2mP and pg
1
lq
˚
|g
1
l
|
is used to
guarantee that the signals forwarded from the selected relays
add constructively at Bob. The received signal by Bob can be
written as given by (8), where the variance of n12 is equal to
σ2p1`řL
1
|g
1
l |
2
α2
l
q. The signals received during the second and
fourth channel uses can be written in vector form as
y “
«
y1
̺ř
l
1
|g
1
l
|
y2
ff
“
„
g
1
1x1,1
g
1
1x1,2

` β1
„
g
1
1x1,2
´g11x1,1

`
«
n
1
1
̺ř
l
1
|g
1
l
|
n
1
2
ff
.
(8)
One can easily conclude that the signals other than x1,1 and
x1,2 are confined to (i.e., aligned by) the sub-space formed by
the signal vector pg11x1,2,´g
1
1x1,1qT which is orthogonal to
pg11x1,1, g
1
1x1,2qT . Since β1 is aligned by pg
1
1x1,2,´g
1
1x1,1qT ,
it was shown in [14] that the destination can use the re-
ceived signals py1, y2q to efficiently decode the symbol pair
tx1,1, x1,2u.
In addition to the two first channel use required to de-
liver the signal y1 to Bob, two channel uses are required
to transmit the pair px1, x2q, as argued above. Since y1
is used in the decoding process of all symbols, the same
applies to the other symbol pairs, that is, each pair requires
two channel uses to be delivered to Bob. To elaborate, the
symbol pair px3, x4q is precoded and transmitted to the
relays in the fifth channel use. To achieve this, Alice uses
again the noiseless part of y1, but this time to dissolve
g
1
1
ř2m
i“1,i‰3 x1,i `
řK
k“2 g
1
k
ř2m
i“1 xk,i in g
1
1x1,4, and it also
calculates the dissolution factor β2. Alice beamforms g
1
1x1,4´
β2g
1
1x1,3 in the direction of tR1,R2, . . . ,RLu. In turn, these
relays amplify and forward the received signal during the
5sixth channel use. Bob uses the signals py1, y3q to decode
the second signal pair tx1,3, x1,4u. Alice, the selected relays
and Bob proceed similarly for the remaining signal pairs. In
general, during the p2mpl ´ 1q ` 2i ´ 1qth channel use for
(ti, lu P r1,ms ˆ r1, Ls), the pmpl ´ 1q ` iqth symbol pair
is precoded then bemformed in the direction of all selected
relays. During the 2pmpl ´ 1q ` i ` 1qth channel use, each
selected relay amplifies and forwards its respective received
signal. The destination then uses py1, ympl´1q`i`1q to decode
the pmpl ´ 1q ` iqth symbol pair.
Based on the above discussion, we conclude that 2pmL`1q
channel uses are required to transmit 2mL symbols, resulting
in rate 2mL
2pmL`1q ÑmÑ8 1 symbol per channel use. We stress
here that ID achieves rate two symbols per channel use for
a point-to-point system [14], whereas, the achievable rate for
the underlying system is halved since it is a two-hop link and
the relays are half-duplex.
As per the ID scheme, for each symbol pair, the remaining
signals are nonlinearly precoded in order to be aligned by the
intended symbol vector. Since the channel gain vector between
the transmitter and any relay (selected or not) is different
from the transmitter-relays-destination’s channel vector, the
remaining signals will not be aligned at these relays. Moreover,
during the first channel use, the transmitter communicates the
sums of 2m symbols tř2mi“1 x1,i,ř2mi“ x2,i, . . . ,ř2mi“1 xL,iu
which implies that each symbol is aligned, i.e., received via
the same channel, with 2m ´ 1 other symbols on the same
channel. Therefore, using interference management techniques
such as real interference alignement [15]–[17], a relay can only
decode the sum of 2m symbols but it cannot separate them.
The implication here is that any of the selected relays cannot
decode symbols individually and hence can not extract any
useful information.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In this paper, we make use of the following expression for
the achievable secrecy rate [10], [11].
Rs “ 1
τ
max
ˆ
0, Ipxm;ymq ´ max
kPr1,Ks
Ipxm; zmk q
˙
, (9)
where τ is the number of channel uses and xmk is the channel
input. The channel output is denoted by the pair tzmk ,ymu,
which represent the received signals by Rk and Bob, respec-
tively. We note that this secrecy rate can be achieved in the
sense of strong secrecy by using the channel resolvability-
based method to code the message [19].1
To analyze (9), we need to analyze the achievable rate on all
subchannels, including the Alice-Bob, Alice-relay channels.
The latter includes the selected and non-selected relays. As
shown above, the symbols are precoded and decoded in pairs.
Moreover, the precoding and decoding processes are similar
for all symbol pairs. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we consider the symbol pair tx1,1, x1,2u in our analysis. We
1Precoding and coding in this paper are used to denote two different signal
processing stages. In the case of PLS, coding is used to map a binary sequence
to a sequence of symbols in order to achieve weak or strong secrecy. Whereas
precoding is used to maximize Alice-Bob’s mutual information and to degrade
Alice-Eve’s channel.
then generalize the result to the remaining mL ´ 1 symbol
pairs. Based on this result, we provide a lower bound on the
achievable secrecy rate at high SNR. These results are used
to provide a lower bound on the achievable secrecy diversity
order.
A. The Achievable Rate for the Alice-Bob Channel
The transmitted symbols and the noise components are
assumed to be Gaussian. Therefore, the signals py1, y2q tend to
be Gaussian and the achievable rate associated to the symbol
pair tx1,1, x1,2u at the destination is lower bounded as given
by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The achievable rate associated to the symbol pair
tx1,1, x1,2u on the Alice-Bob channel is lower bounded as
RBobpx1,1, x1,2q ě log2
¨
˝1` 2mP řLl“1 |g1l|2
σ2
´
1`řLl“1 |gl|2α2
l
¯
˛
‚´ 1.
(10)
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is clear from (10) that the lower bound is independent
of the symbol pair index, and it only depends on the selected
relays. As such, the same bound applies to all symbol pairs.
Recall that the number of channel uses required to transmit
the 2mL symbols is 2pmL ` 1q. Consequently, the average
achievable rate at Bob for large values of mL is given as
RBob “ 1
2pmL` 1q
˜
Lÿ
l“1
mÿ
i“1
Rpxl,2i´1, xl,2iq
¸
ě 1
2pmL` 1q
Lÿ
l“1
mÿ
i“1
»
–log2
¨
˝1` 2mP řLl“1 |g1l|2
σ2
´
1`řLl“1 |gl|2α2
l
¯
˛
‚´ 1
fi
fl
» 1
2
log2
¨
˝1` 2mP řLl“1 |g1l|2
σ2
´
1`řLl“1 |gl|2α2
l
¯
˛
‚´ 1
2
.
(11)
Note that the transmission of the mL symbols is performed
within the same (finite) coherence time, which might appear
as a contradiction with the assumption of having large values
of mL. The assumption of having large values of mL is
considered merely to determine the multiplexing gain (pre-
log factor). The original expression is mL
2pmL`1q . When mL
is very large, this expression approaches 1
2
. This is true even
if mL is not very large. For example, when mL “ 20, the
expression becomes 1
2
´ 1
42
» 1
2
. It should be emphasized
here that this assumption has nothing to do with the achievable
secrecy diversity order, which is the focus of this paper.
In the sequel, we are interested in determining the achiev-
able secrecy diversity order, which is valid at high SNR. In
this case, we have
α2l “ |h
1
l,l|2`
σ2
2mP
» |h1l,l|2 and |g
1
l|2 “
|gl|2|h1l,l|2
α2l
» |gl|2.
6Consequently, the expression in (11) simplifies at high SNR
as
RBob ě 1
2
log2
¨
˚˝˚
1` 2mP
řL
l“1 |gl|2
σ2
ˆ
1`řLl“1 |gl|2|h1
l,l
|2
˙
˛
‹‹‚´ 12 . (12)
B. The Achievable rate for the Alice-Selected Relay channels
In this subsection, we first derive the achievable rate
associated to a selected relay considering the symbol pair
tx1,1, x1,2u. We then generalize it to the remaining symbol
pairs. Recall that the received signals by Rl during the first
and third channel uses can be written as
„
zl,1
zl,2

“
»
– h1l,l
ř2m
i“1 xl,i
h
1
l,lř
L
l“1 |g
1
l
|2
pg11x1,2 ´ g
1
1β1x1,1q
fi
fl` „nl,1
nl,2

, (13)
where nl,1 and nl,2 are both AWGN with zero mean and
variance σ2.
Since β1 in (11) is a nonlinear combination of signals and
the vector channel tg11, g
1
2, . . . , g
1
Lu, zl,1 cannot be written as
g
1
1px1,1 ` β1x1,2q ` n1,1. Hence, the remaining signals are
not aligned by the intended one as in (8). Although Eve
collocated with Rl has the Alice-Bob’s CSI, it cannot proceed
similar to Bob to decode x1,1 and x1,2 because the remaining
symbols are not aligned by the intended one at the relays.
Moreover, each symbol is aligned with 2m ´ 1 symbols on
the same channel in z1,1, i.e., received over the same channel
as 2m´ 1 symbols. Hence, Eve cannot use real interference
alignment [15]–[17] to separate the signals. In z1,2, β1 is
unknown and Eve cannot use this signal to extract any of the
two symbols. This heuristic interpretation suggests, from an
information theoretic perspective, that the proposed technique
achieves very low rate at Eve, which is proved in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2. At high SNR, the achievable rate associated to the
symbol pair tx1,1, x1,2u on the Alice´Rl (l P r1, Ls) channel
is given by:
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q » log2
¨
˚˝
1` |gl|
2řL
j“1
j‰l
|gj |2
˛
‹‚. (14)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The expression of the achievable rate in (14) is independent
of the index of the transmitted pair of symbols. It depends only
on the considered relays. Therefore, this expression is valid for
all other symbol pairs. Consequently, the achievable rate per
channel use at high SNR at a given selected relay is upper
bounded as
RRl »
m
2pm` 1q log2
˜
1` |gl|
2ř
j“1,j‰l |gj |2
¸
» 1
2
log2
˜
1` |gl|
2ř
j“1,j‰l |gj|2
¸
ď 1
2
max
lPr1,Ls
log2
¨
˚˝
1` |gl|
2řL
j“1
j‰l
|gj|2
˛
‹‚.
(15)
C. The Achievable Rate for the Alice-Non Selected Relays
Channels
Let us now consider a non selected relay belonging to the
set tRL`1,RL`2, . . . ,RKu. We adopt the same strategy as in
the previous section where we first consider the symbol pair
tx1,1, x1,2u. A non selected relay Rl l P rL` 1,Ks can take
advantage of the signal transmitted by Alice during the first
and third channel uses, in order to decode tx1,1, x1,2u, which
can be written in vector form as„
zl,1
zl,2

“
« řL
l“1 h
1
l,j
ř2m
i“1 xl,iř
L
l“1 h
1
l,j
̺
pg11x1,2 ´ β1g
1
1xl,1q
ff
`
„
nj,1
nj,2

, (16)
where nl,1 and nl,2 are both AWGN with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2. In the second line of (16), we use h1l,j to denote
hlb
T
j
}bj}
.
We hereafter use h
1
l to denote the vector ph
1
l,1, h
1
l,2, . . . , h
1
l,LqT .
Lemma 3. At high SNR, the achievable rate associated to the
symbol pair px1,1, x1,2q on the Alice ´ Rl (l P rL ` 1,Ks)
channel, does not scale with power for almost all channel
realizations and it can be written as
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q » log2
˜
}h1l}2}g}2
}h1l}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
l, gy2
¸
. (17)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Given that the expression in (17) does not depend on the
symbol pair index, the achievable rate at high SNR at a given
non-selected relay is given as
RRl »
m
2pm` 1q log2
˜
}h1l}2}g}2
}h1l}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
l, gy2
¸
» 1
2
log2
˜
}h1l}2}g}2
}h1l}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
l, gy2
¸
.
(18)
Now that we have obtained expressions for the achievable rate
on all sub-channels, we proceed in the next section where we
make use of these results to determine the achievable secrecy
diversity order.
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY DIVERSITY ORDER
Given that the underlying channel is Rayleigh fading,
there is a relationship between the outage probability and
the achievable secrecy rate. Specifically, PoutpSNR, γq “
Pr rRspSNRq ă γs where SNR is defined as SNR ∆“ 2mPσ2 and
7γ is a secrecy rate threshold [20]. Consequently, the achievable
secrecy diversity order is defined as
d
∆“ lim
SNRÑ8
´ logPoutpSNR, γq
log SNR .
In Section III, we provided a lower bound on the achievable
rate on the Alice-Bob channel. Moreover, we provided an
upper bound on the achievable rate on the Alice-relay channel
(selected and non selected). These give a lower bound on
the achievable secrecy rate. Since the diversity order is by
definition computed asymptotically at high SNR, we make use
of the secrecy rate lower bound to provide an upper bound on
the outage probability at high SNR, which is used later to
provide a lower bound on the achievable diversity order. The
secrecy rate is given (9) and can be lower bounded at high
SNR as
Rs “ max
ˆ
0, RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl
˙
ě max
$’’&
’’%0,
1
2
log2
¨
˚˝˚
1` 2mP
řL
l“1 |gl|2
σ2
ˆ
1`řLl“1 |gl|2|h1
l,l
|2
˙
˛
‹‹‚´ 12
´ 1
2
max
»
—– max
lPr1,Ls
log2
¨
˚˝
1` |gl|
2řL
j“1
j‰l
|gj |2
˛
‹‚,
max
lPrL`1,Ks
log2
˜
}h1l}2}g}2
}h1l}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
l, gy2
¸ff+
.
(19)
On the other hand, the outage probability can be written as
PoutpSNR, γq “ Pr
„
max
ˆ
0, RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl
˙
ă γ

“ Pr r0 ă γsloooomoooon
“1
Pr
„ˆ
RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl
˙
ă γ

“ Pr
„ˆ
RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl
˙
ă γ

.
(20)
Next, we show that for a given positive real constant ǫ ! 1,
which can be as small as desired, there exists a SNRth such
that max
lPr1,Ks
Rl can be upper bounded by 12 log2pSNRǫq @SNR ě
SNRth, i.e., lim
SNRÑ8
Pr
„
max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă 12 log2pSNRǫq

“ 1. This
bound is used later to provide an upper bound on the outage
probability.
In (21) on the next page, we provide an expression for
the outage probability as a function of Pout1pSNRǫq “
Pr
„
max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă 12 log2pSNRǫq

.
Lemma 4. Pout1pSNRǫq Ñ
SNRÑ8
1
Proof. See Appendix D.
Invoking the result in Lemma 4, the upper bound on the
outage probability given in (21) becomes
Poutpγ, SNRq
ď Pr
„
RBob ´ 1
2
log2pSNRǫq ă γ| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă 1
2
log2pSNRǫq

.
(22)
Lemma 5. At high SNR and for a given small constant ǫ, the
outage probability can be upper bounded as
Poutpγ, SNRq ď Pr
»
—– Lÿ
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|2 ă 2
2γ`1`
SNR1´ǫ ´ 22γ`2SNRǫ˘
fi
ffifl ,
(23)
where lm “ argmax
lPr1,Ls
p|gl|2q.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Since the components of channel vector g follow the
Rayleigh distribution,
řL
l“1,l‰lm |gl|2 follows a Chi-square
distribution with order 2pL ´ 1q. From [20] and (19), we
express the achievable secrecy diversity order as
d “ lim
SNRÑ8
´ logPr rRs ď γs
log SNR
ě lim
SNRÑ8
´ logPr
„řL
l“1
l‰lm
`
SNR1´ǫ ´ 22γ`2SNRǫ˘ |gl|2 ă 22γ`1

log SNR
» lim
SNRÑ8
´ logPr
„řL
l“1
l‰lm
SNR1´ǫ|gl|2 ă 22γ`1

log SNR
“ pL´ 1qp1´ ǫq.
(24)
Since ǫ can be as small as desired, the proposed technique can
therefore achieve a secrecy diversity order equal to the number
of selected relays L. The only condition imposed on the
number of selected relays is 2 ď L ď minpN,Kq, suggesting
that Alice can select up to pminpN,Kq ´ 1q relays and this
yields a secrecy diversity order of up to minpN,Kq ´ 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. System and Simulation Setup
In this section, we provide simulation and numerical results
to validate the analytical results obtained in the previous
sections. It is assumed that Alice is equipped with four
antennas, and there are 10 relays. The number of selected
relays varies from two to four. Bob is assumed to be equipped
with a single antenna. All channels are Rayleigh distributed
with variance one. We assume that each relay can provide an
average SNR of 2mP
σ2
which is independent from the number of
the selected relays. The SNR considering in simulation results
is the SNR per relay. This implies that the total used transmit
power increases as the number of the selected relays increase.
However, increasing the total transmit power does not affect
the secrecy diversity order.
8PoutpSNR, γq
“ Pr
„
RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl ă γ

“ p1´ Pout1pSNRǫqqPr
„
RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl ă γ| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ě
1
2
log
2
pSNRǫq

` Pout1pSNRǫqPr
„
RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl ă γ| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă
1
2
log
2
pSNRǫq

ď p1´ Pout1pSNRǫqqPr
„
RBob ´ max
lPr1,Ks
RRl ă γ| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ě
1
2
log
2
pSNRǫq

` Pout1pSNRǫqPr
„
RBob ´
1
2
log
2
pSNRǫq ă γ| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă
1
2
log
2
pSNRǫq

.
(21)
B. Achievable secrecy diversity order
We evaluate the achievable secrecy diversity order as a
function of the SNR in dB for the above system setup. We
plot the outage probability in Fig. 2 where the secrecy rate
threshold is set to γ “ 1. In the figure, we compare the
exact outage probability with the corresponding upper bound.
The exact expression for the achievable rate on the Alice-
Bob channel is given by (25), where the exact expressions
of the denominator and nominator are given by (26) and (27),
respectively. The other exact expressions of the achievable rate
on the other channels can be found in Appendices B and C.
The results corresponding to the upper bound on the outage
probability (UB) are obtained by considering the asymptotic
lower bound on the secrecy rate given in (19). It is clear from
the figure that the outage probability slope, for the proposed
technique, is equal to L´1 and hence it matches the theoretical
lower bound. The asymptotic lower bound is close to the exact
outage probability which proves the tightness of the provided
secrecy rate lower bound.
We also compare in the same figure the performance of
the proposed scheme with the distributed beamforming (DBF)
scheme proposed in [12] which provides, to the best of our
knowledge, the best performance in terms of the achievable
diversity order. As shown in the figure, the proposed technique
outperforms the DBF technique when L ą 2. Both schemes
have the same secrecy diversity order when L “ 2, however
the DBF outperforms the proposed scheme for this particular
case. The reason is that the results are plotted against the SNR
in dB per relay, and this makes it more advantageous for the
DBF since all relays are used for relaying, whereas only two
relays are used in the proposed scheme.
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Fig. 2: Outage probability at the destination versus SNR(dB).
C. Achievable secrecy rate
Fig. 3 depicts the achievable secrecy rate as a function
of SNR for different numbers of untrusted relays, namely,
K “ 4, 6, 8, 10, 12. The exact expression of the secrecy rate
is considered in this figure. We set N “ L “ 3. The figure
shows that the secrecy rate increases with the SNR, which
confirms that the rates associated to the untrusted relays do
not scale with power. The figure shows also that the secrecy
rate decreases as the number of untrusted relays increases. In
fact, the secrecy rate is equal to the difference between the
achievable rate at Bob and the maximum of the achievable
rates corresponding to the untrusted relays, which increases
as K increases. However, the loss in the secrecy rate is not
considerable as the number of untrusted relays increases. The
secrecy rate decreases by approximately a half bit as the
number of untrusted relays goes from 4 to 10. This proves
the robustness of the proposed technique to the number of
untrusted relays.
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Fig. 3: Achievable secrecy rate versus SNR(dB).
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied in this paper the achievable secrecy diversity
order of cooperative networks with untrusted relays. We con-
sidered a two-hop network comprising an N -antenna Alice, K
single-antenna relays and a single antenna Bob. We proposed
a nonlinear PLS technique, based on a previously proposed
interference alignment scheme, that ensures secure communi-
cation between Alice and Bob via the untrusted relays. The
proposed scheme was analyzed in terms the achievable secrecy
rate and secrecy diversity order. It was shown that a secrecy
diversity order of up to pminpN,Kq ´ 1q is achievable. This
is an important result because it is contrary to what has been
published so far on this subject. In particular, it has been
shown that the achievable secrecy diversity order is one for the
case when K may higher than N . Furthermore, the proposed
method does not use artificial noise which is deemed the
only option to secure communications for the adopted system
model. The achieved performance is based on random relay
selection. We believe that a proper relay selection method can
dramatically enhance the achievable diversity order.
APPENDIX A
Since the transmitted symbols and the noise components
are Gaussian, the signals py1, y2q tend to be Gaussian and the
achievable rate associated to the symbol pair tx1,1, x1,2u at
the destination is written as
RBobpx1,1, x1,2q “ Ipx1,1, x1,2; y1, y2q
“ Hpy1, y2q ´Hpy1, y2|x1,1, x1,2q
“ log
2
ˆ
|Cpy1, y2q|
Er|Cpy1, y2|x1,1, x1,2q|s
˙
,
(25)
where Cpy1, y2q and Cpy1, y2|x1,1, x1,2q are the covariances
of py1, y2q and py1, y2q given px1,1, x1,2q, respectively. Their
explicit formulas are given in (26) and (27) on the next page,
respectively. The first inequality in (27) comes from the fact
that p
řL
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2
̺2
“ p
řL
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2ř
L
l“1 |g
1
l
|2
ě 1 and hence 1` p
řL
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2
̺2
ď
2
p
ř
L
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2
̺2
.
Substituting (27) in (25), we obtain a lower bounded on the
achievable rate as follows.
RBobpx1,1, x1,2q ě log2
¨
˝1` 2mP̺2
σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
˛
‚` log
2
ˆ
1
2
˙
“ log
2
¨
˝1` 2mP řLl“1 |g1l |2
σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
˛
‚` log
2
ˆ
1
2
˙
“ log
2
¨
˝1` 2mP řLl“1 |g1l |2
σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
˛
‚´ 1,
(28)
which proves (10).
APPENDIX B
The rate associated to px1,1, x1,2q given pz1,1, z1,2q is:
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q “ Ipx1,1, x1,2; zl,1, zl,2q
“ Hpzl,1, zl,2q ´Hpzl,1, zl,2|x1,1, x1,2q
“ log2
ˆ |Cpzl,1, zl,2q|
E r|Cpzl,1, zl,2|x1,1, x1,2q|s
˙
.
(29)
Since only R1 receives a signal depending on
tx1,1, x1,2u in the first channel use, the expression
of E r|Cpz1,1, z1,2|x1,1, x1,2q|s differs slightly from the
remaining covariance matrices. Explicit expressions of the
covariance matrices are given in (30), (31) and (32), where
the expression in (32) is valid for all l P r2, Ls. At large
values of m, we have m ´ 1 » m and hence the covariance
in (31) can be written as (32) by replacing l by one. Next,
we consider the case of large values of m and we thus use
the general expression provided in (32). The expressions of
the covariance matrix in (30) and (32) can be written in the
form pPC1 ` σ2qpPC2 ` σ2q and σ2pPC3 ` σ2q ` P 2C4,
respectively, where tC1, C2, C3, C4u are constants at high
SNR. They depend only on the index of the considered relay.
The achievable rate can be written as
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q “ log2
ˆ pPC1 ` σ2qpPC2 ` σ2q
σ2pPC3 ` σ2q ` P 2C4
˙
. (33)
We observe from (33) that, at high SNR, the denominator
scales with P 2. Given that the denominator also scales with
P 2, the achievable rate becomes a constant at high SNR. That
is,
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q » log2
ˆ
C1C2
C4
˙
» log2
˜ řL
j“1 |gj|2řL
j“1,j‰l |gj |2
¸
» log2
˜
1` |gl|
2řL
j“1,j‰l |gl|2
¸
,
(34)
which proves (14).
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|Cpy1, y2q| “
ˇˇˇ
ˇ Er|y1|2s Ery1py2q˚sErpy1q˚y2s Er|y2|2s
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
“
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ 2mP̺2 ` σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
0
0
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2
̺2
2mP̺2 ` σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
“
˜
2mP̺
2 ` σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸¸˜
2mP p
Lÿ
l“1
|g
1
l |q
2 ` σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸¸
loooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooon
term1
.
(26)
Er|Cpy1, y2|x1,1, x1,2q|s “ E
„ˇˇˇ
ˇ Er|y1|2|x1,1, x1,2s Ery1y˚2 |x1,1, x1,2sEry˚
1
y2|x1,1, x1,2s Er|y2|
2|x1,1, x1,2s
ˇˇˇ
ˇ

“ E
»
——–
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ
2P
´
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
řL
l“2 |g
1
l |
2
¯
` σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
´2P
c
p
ř
L
l“1
|g
1
l
|q2
̺2
´
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
řL
l“2 |g
1
l |
2
¯´
x1,1
x1,2
¯˚
´2P
c
p
ř
L
l“1
|g
1
l
|q2
̺2
´
pm´ 1qP |g
1
1|
2 `m
řL
l“2 |g
1
l |
2
¯
x1,1
x1,2
2P
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2
̺2
´
pm´ 1qP |g
1
1|
2 `m
řl
l“2 |g
1
l |
2
¯
x2
1,1
x2
1,2
` σ2
´
1`
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
α2
l
¯
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ
fi
ffiffifl
“
˜
2pm´ 1qP |g
1
1|
2 ` 2mP
Lÿ
l“2
|g
1
l |
2 ` σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸¸˜
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
l |q
2
̺2
˜
2pm´ 1qP |g
1
1|
2 `mP
Lÿ
l“2
|g
1
l |
2
¸
E
„
x21,1
x2
1,2

` σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸¸
´
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
1|q
2
̺2
˜
2pm´ 1qP |g
1
1|
2 ` 2mP
Lÿ
l“2
|g
1
l |
2
¸
2
E
„
x21,1
x2
1,2

“ σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸«
2P
˜
1`
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
1|q
2
̺2
¸˜
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
Lÿ
l“2
|g
1
l |
2
¸
` σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸ff
ď σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸«
4P
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
1|q
2
̺2
˜
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
Lÿ
l“2
|g
1
l |
2
¸
` σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸ff
ď σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸«
4P
p
řL
l“1 |g
1
1|q
2
̺2
˜
m|g
1
1|
2 `m
Lÿ
l“2
|g
1
l |
2
¸
` 2σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸ff
“ σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸»————–4mP p
Lÿ
l“1
|g
1
1|q
2 ` 2σ2
˜
1`
Lÿ
l“1
|gl|
2
α2l
¸
loooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooon
2ˆterm1
fi
ffiffiffiffifl .
(27)
|Cpzl,1, zl,2q| “
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ 2mP |h
1
l,l|
2 ` σ2 0
0
2mP |h
1
l,l|
2
̺2
̺2 ` σ2
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ
“
´
2mP |h
1
l,l|
2 ` σ2
¯´
2mP |h
1
l,l|
2 ` σ2
¯
.
(30)
Er|Cpz1,1, z1,2|x1,1, x1,2q|s “ E
»
—–
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
2P pm´ 1q|h
1
1,1|
2 ` σ2 ´
´
x1,1
x1,2
¯˚
2P pm´ 1q
|h
1
1,1|
2
̺
pg
1
1q
˚
´
x1,1
x1,2
2P pm´ 1q
|h
1
1,1|
2
̺
g
1
1
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2
2P
|h
1
1,1|
2
̺2
´
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
řL
j“2 |g
1
j |
2
¯
` σ2
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
fi
ffifl
“ σ2
˜
2pm´ 1qP |h
1
1,1|
2 ` E
„
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2

2P
|h
1
1,1|
2
̺2
˜
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
Lÿ
j“2
|g
1
j |
2
¸
` σ2
¸
` E
„
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2

4P
2
mpm´ 1q|h
1
1,1|
4
řL
j“2 |g
1
j |
2řL
j“1 |g
1
j |
2
.
(31)
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Er|Cpzl,1, zl,2|x1,1, x1,2q|s “ E
»
—–
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
2Pm|h
1
l,l|
2 ` σ2 ´
´
x1,1
x1,2
¯˚
2Pm
|h
1
l,l|
2
̺
pg
1
lq
˚
´
x1,1
x1,2
2Pm
|h
1
l,l|
2
̺
g
1
l
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2
2P
|h
1
l,l|
2
̺2
´
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
řL
j“2 |g
1
j |
2
¯
` σ2
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
fi
ffifl
“ σ2
˜
2mP |h
1
l,l|
2 `E
„
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2

2P
|h
1
l,l|
2
̺2
˜
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
Lÿ
j“2
|g
1
j |
2
¸
` σ2
¸
`E
„
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2

4P
2|h
1
l,l|
4
˜
m
2
řL
j“2,j‰l |g
1
j |
2řL
j“1 |g
1
j |
2
`mpm´ 1q
|g
1
1|
2řL
j“1 |g
1
j |
2
¸
.
(32)
APPENDIX C
The rate associated to px1,1, x1,2q given pzl,1, zl,2q is ex-
pressed as
Ipx1,1, x1,2; zl,1, zl,2q “
log2
ˆ |Cpzl,1, zl,2q|
E r|Cpzl,1, zl,2|x1,1, x1,2q|s
˙
.
(35)
Explicit expressions of the covariance matrices are given in
(36) and (37) on the next page. These expressions can be
written in the form pPC5`σ2qpPC6`σ2q and σ2pPC7`σ2q`
P 2C8, respectively, where tC5, C6, C7, C8u are constants at
high transmit power. The achievable rate can be written:
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q “ log2
ˆ pPC5 ` σ2qpPC6 ` σ2q
σ2pPC7 ` σ2q ` P 2C8
˙
. (38)
At high SNR and when C8 ‰ 0, we observe from (38) that the
denominator scales with P 2. Given that the denominator also
scales with P 2, the achievable rate becomes a constant at high
SNR. The achievable rate scales with the transmit power if and
only if C8 “ 0. By Cauchy Schwartz inequality, C8 is zero
if and only if p?m´ 1h1l,1,
?
mh
1
l,2, . . . ,
?
mh
1
l,Lq is parallel
to p?m´ 1g11,
?
mg
1
2, . . . ,
?
mg
1
Lq, i.e., ph
1
l,1, h
1
l,2, . . . , h
1
l,Lq
is parallel to pg11, g
1
2, . . . , g
1
Lq.
The two channel vectors ph1l,1, h
1
l,2, . . . , h
1
l,Lq and
pg11, g
1
2, . . . , g
1
Lq are independent. The scenario when
these two vectors are parallel is practically impossible and
thus RRlpx1,1, x1,2q converges to a constant, i.e., does not
scale with P at high SNR for almost all channel realizations.
Therefore, for almost all channel realizations, the achievable
rate, at high SNR and for high values of m, can be written as
RRlpx1,1, x1,2q » log2
ˆ
C5C6
C8
˙
» log2
ˆ }hl}2}g}2
}hl}2}g}2 ´ xhl, gy2
˙
,
(39)
which proves (17)
APPENDIX D
Note that max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ď 12 log2pSNRǫq implies that the rate
on Alice-relay channel (selected or non selected) is less than
1
2
log2pSNRǫq. This is equivalent to$’&
’%
|gl|
2ř
L
j“1
j‰l
|gj |2
ă SNRǫ ´ 1, @l P r1, Ls
}h
1
l}
2}gl}2
}h
1
l
}2}g}2´xh
1
l
,gy2
ă SNRǫ @l P rL` 1,Ks
(40)
To get Pout1pSNRǫq Ñ
SNRÑ8
1, the probability that the events
in (40) occur should approach one as SNR tends to infinity.
Now we have
Pr
»
—– |gl|2řL
j“1
j‰l
|gj |2
ă SNRǫ ´ 1,@l P r1, Ls
fi
ffifl
“ Pr
»
—– max
lPr1,Ls
|gl|2řL
j“1
j‰l
|gj|2
ă SNRǫ ´ 1
fi
ffifl
“ Pr
»
—–|glm|2 ă pSNRǫ ´ 1q Lÿ
j“1
j‰lm
|gj |2
fi
ffifl ,
(41)
where lm “ argmax
lPr1,Ls
p|gl|2q is the index of the maximum
channel gain among the vector p|g1|2, |g2|2, . . . , |gL|2q. The
term pSNRǫ ´ 1qřLj“1
j‰lm
|gj|2 increases as SNR increases.
Therefore, the probability in (41) approaches one as SNR tends
to infinity.
Let us now analyze Pr
„
}h
1
l}
2}g}2
}h
1
l
}2}g}2´xh
1
l
,gy2
ă SNRǫ

. When-
ever
}h
1
l}
2}g}2
}h
1
l
}2}g}2´xh
1
l
,gy2
ă SNRǫ, it means that
ˇˇˇ
xh1l, gy
ˇˇˇ2
}h1l}2}g}2
ă 1´ 1SNRǫ .
Let us consider the normalized vector h
1
l “ h
1
l
}h
1
l
}
and its
orthogonal normalized vector ph1lqK “ ph
1
lq
K
p}h
1
l
}qK
. The channel
vector g can be decomposed into parallel and orthogonal
components as follows.
g “ xg,h1lyh
1
l ` xg, ph
1
lqKyph
1
lqK.
We use gK “ xh1l, ph
1
lqKy and g‖ “ xg,h
1
ly to denote
the perpendicular and parallel components, respectively. Since
12
|Cpzl,1, zl,2q| “
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ 2mP řLj“1 |h1l,j |2 ` σ2 0
0 2mP
p
řL
j“1 h
1
l,jq
2
̺2
řL
j“1 |g
1
j |
2 ` σ2
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
“
˜
2mP
Lÿ
j“1
|h
1
l,j |
2 ` σ2
¸˜
2mP
p
řL
j“1 h
1
l,jq
2
̺2
Lÿ
j“1
|g
1
j |
2 ` σ2
¸
“
˜
2mP
Lÿ
j“1
|h
1
l,j |
2 ` σ2
¸˜
2mP p
Lÿ
j“1
h
1
l,jq
2 ` σ2
¸
.
(36)
Er|Cpzl,1, zl,2|x1,1, x1,2q|s
“ E
»
—–
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
2P ppm´ 1q|h
1
l,1|
2 `m
řL
l“2 |h
1
l,j |
2q ` σ2 ´
p
řL
j“1 h
1
l,jq
˚x
˚
1,1
̺x
˚
1,2
P
´
2pm´ 1qpg
1
1q
˚h
1
l,1 ` 2m
řL
j“2pg
1
jq
˚h
1
l,j
¯
p
řL
j“1 h
1
l,jqx1,1
̺x1,2
P
´
2pm´ 1qpg
1
1qph
1
l,1q
˚ ` 2m
řL
j“2pg
1
jqph
1
l,jq
˚
¯
|x1,1|
2
|x1,2|2
P
p
řl
j“1 h
1
l,jq
2
̺2
´
2pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 ` 2m
řL
j“2 |g
1
j |
2
¯
` σ2
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
fi
ffifl
“ σ2
˜
2P ppm´ 1q|h
1
l,1|
2 `m
Lÿ
j“2
|h
1
l,j |
2q ` 2P
p
řL
j“1 h
1
l,jq
2
̺2
˜
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2 `m
Lÿ
j“2
|g
1
j |
2
¸
` σ2
¸
` 4P 2
p
řL
j“1 h
1
l,jq
2
̺2
«˜
pm´ 1q|g
1
1|
2
`m
Lÿ
j“2
|g
1
j |
2
¸˜
pm´ 1q|h
1
l,j |
2 ` 2m
Lÿ
j“2
|h
1
l,j |
2
¸
´
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇpm´ 1qpg11q˚h1l,1 `m Lÿ
j“2
pg
1
jq
˚
h
1
l,j
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ
2
ff
.
(37)
}g}2 “ }gK}2 ` }g‖}2, we can write
ˇˇˇ
xh1l, gy
ˇˇˇ2
}h1l}2}g}2
“
ˇˇˇ
ˇx h1l}h1
l
}
, gy
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
2
}g}2
“
ˇˇˇ
xh1l, gy
ˇˇˇ2
}g}2
“ }g
‖}2
}gK}2 ` }g‖}2 .
(42)
The magnitude of the elements of the channel vector g be-
tween the selected relays and the destination follows Rayleigh
distribution. From [21], }g‖}2 „ Γp1, 1q and }pgqK}2 „
ΓpL ´ 1, 1q, where Γpp, λq denotes the Γ distribution with
parameters pp, λq. By applying this result and considering (42),
we can obtain [22]
ˇˇˇ
xh1l, gy
ˇˇˇ2
}h1l}2}g}2
„ βp1, L´ 1q,
where βpp, λq denotes the Beta distribution with parameters
pp, λq. Furthermore, it is known that the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of the Beta distribution is the regularized
incomplete Beta function [22]. Consequently, we obtain,
Pr
«
}h1l}2}g}2
}h1l}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
l, gy2
ă SNRǫ, @l P rL` 1,Ks
ff
“
Kź
l“L`1
Pr
«
}h1l}2}g}2
}h1l}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
l, gy2
ă SNRǫ
ff
“
«
Pr
˜
}h1L`1}2}g}2
}h1L`1}2}g}2 ´ xh
1
L`1, gy2
ă SNRǫ
¸ffK´L
“
¨
˚˝
Pr
»
—–
ˇˇˇ
xh1L`1, gy
ˇˇˇ2
}h1L`1}2}g}2
ă 1´ 1SNRǫ
fi
ffifl
˛
‹‚
K´L
“
˜
β
`
1´ 1SNRǫ ; 1, L´ 1
˘
βp1, L´ 1q
¸K´L
“
´
I1´ 1SNRǫ
p1, L´ 1q
¯K´L
“
˜
1´
ˆ
1
SNRǫ
˙L´1¸K´L
Ñ
SNRÑ8
1,
(43)
where β
`
1´ 1SNRǫ ; 1, L´ 1
˘
and I1´ 1SNRǫ p1, L ´ 1q denotes
the incomplete Beta function and the regularized incomplete
Beta function, respectively. The probabilities in (41) and (43)
approach one as SNR tends to infinity. There product is equal
to Pout1pSNRq Ñ
SNRÑ8
1. This proves (22).
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APPENDIX E
Poutpγ, SNRq
ď Pr
„
RBob ´ 1
2
log2pSNRǫq ă γ| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă 1
2
log2pSNRǫq

“ Pr
»
——–12 log2
¨
˚˝˚
1` SNR
řL
l“1 |gl|2ˆ
1`řLl“1 |gl|2|h1
l,l
|2
˙
˛
‹‹‚´ 12 ´ 12 log2pSNRǫq ă γ
| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă 1
2
log2pSNRǫq
ff
ď Pr
»
–1
2
log2
¨
˝SNR1´ǫřLl“1 |gl|2
1`řLl“1 |gl|2|h1
l,l
|2
˛
‚ă γ ` 1
2
| max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă 1
2
log2pSNRǫq
ff
.
(44)
whenever RBob ´ 12 log2pSNRǫq ă γ and max
lPr1,Ks
Rl ă
1
2
log2pSNRǫq yield$’’&
’’%
SNR1´ǫ
řL
l“1 |gl|
2
1`
ř
L
l“1
|gl|
2
|h
1
l,l
|2
ă 22γ`1
|glm|2 ă pSNRǫ ´ 1q
řL
j“1
j‰lm
|gj |2
. (45)
This is equivalent to the following inequalities.$’&
’%
SNR1´ǫ
řL
l“1 |gl|2 ´ 22γ`1
řL
l“1
|gl|
2
|h
1
l,l
|2
ă 22γ`1
|glm|2 ă pSNRǫ ´ 1q
řL
j“1
j‰lm
|gj|2, (46)
which is equivalent to$’&
’%
SNR1´ǫ|glm|2 ´ 2
2γ`1|glm|
2
|h
1
lm,lm
|2
`řLl“1
l‰lm
|gl|2pSNR1´ǫ ´ 22γ`1|h1
l,l
|2
q ă 22γ`1
|glm|2 ă pSNRǫ ´ 1q
řL
j“1
j‰lm
|gj |2.
(47)
To obtain an upper bound on the outage probability at high
SNR, we provide a lower bound on the first inequality in
(47). This can be obtained by subtracting the first term, in
the first inequality, and replacing |glm| in the second term, in
the first inequality, by its upper bound provided by the second
inequality in (47). That is,
´
22γ`1
řL
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|2
|h1lm,lm|2
`
Lÿ
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|2pSNR1´ǫ ´ 2
2γ`1
|h1l,l|2
q ă 22γ`1
which can be rearranged as
Lÿ
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|2
˜
SNR1´ǫ ´ 22γ`1
˜
1
|h1l,l|2
` 1|h1lm,lm|2
¸¸
ă 22γ`1.
(48)
At high SNR, the outage probability can thus be outer bounded
as given in (49) on the next page.
The probability Pout2pSNRǫq “ Pr
„
max
lPr1,Ls
1
|h
1
l,l
|2
ă SNRǫ

approaches one as SNR tends to infinity. Indeed, the magnitude
of the channel vector h
1
l resulting from ZFBF follows Rayleigh
distribution [18]. Therefore Pout2pSNRǫq can be written as
follows.
Pr
«
max
lPr1,Ls
1
|h1l,l|2
ă SNRǫ
ff
“ Pr
«
1
|h1l,l|2
ă SNRǫ,@l P r1, Ls
ff
“
ˆ
Pr
„
1
|h1
1
|2 ă SNR
ǫ
˙L
“
ˆ
1´ Pr
„
|h11|2 ą
1
SNRǫ
˙L
“
´
1´ e 12SNRǫ
¯L
Ñ
SNRÑ8
0.
(50)
This yields at high SNR an upper bound on the outage
probability as
Poutpγ, SNRq ď Pr
»
—– Lÿ
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|
2
˜
SNR1´ǫ ´ 2
2γ`1
|h
1
l,l|
2
`
22γ`1
|h
1
lm|
2
¸
ă 22γ`1
| max
lPr1,Ls
1
|h
1
l,l|
2
ă SNRǫ
ff
ď Pr
»
—– Lÿ
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|
2
`
SNR1´ǫ ´ 22γ`1p2SNRǫq
˘
ă 22γ`1
fi
ffifl
“ Pr
»
—– Lÿ
l“1
l‰lm
|gl|
2 ă
22γ`1`
SNR1´ǫ ´ 22γ`2SNRǫ
˘
fi
ffifl .
(51)
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